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This paper investigates the changing duties and responsibilities of
boards and directors of Australian public companies. The corporate
governance environment in Australia is currently going through a period
of significant transformation raising the question of whether in this
fluid and shifting environment company and board performance can
still be assessed largely on the basis of profit, share price and dividends
generated over the short term. These almost certainly will continue for
some time to be the key metrics of company and board performance
and it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Nevertheless, a growing
chorus of influential stakeholders is calling for the introduction of a
more balanced and comprehensive suite of performance indicators that
better reflect the realities of corporate governance early in the Twentyfirst Century. The paper examines how these stakeholders are reshaping
corporate governance in Australia and also calling for a reconsideration
of the way in which performance is assessed.
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extension a board’s performance as well. It is
obvious then that the paper addresses largely
through an Australian lens the question of what
indicators other than these conventional metrics can
be used to ensure a more balanced and
comprehensive picture of company and board
performance is produced than has traditionally been
possible. Even with its distinctly Australian focus,
however, there are good grounds for believing that
the relevance of any answers offered in the paper
extends well beyond the Australian context to other
countries and national economies. Just as in
Australia so in other jurisdictions around the world,
the question of what criteria should be used to

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the extent to which an
Australian
publicly-listed
(public)
company’s
performance can be attributed to the governance
performance of its board. A primary question also
addressed therefore is how company performance
itself should be evaluated. Of particular interest will
be whether, as Australia’s system of corporate
governance goes through a process of significant
reformulation and change, the conventional metrics
of profit, share price and dividends can any longer
together be taken as the sole or most important and
accurate gauge of a company’s performance and by
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measure company and board performance is
becoming an increasingly urgent one as company
boards and executives confront a number of
significant environmental, political and social
challenges.
The following section critically reviews recent
academic literature addressing the change and
transformation through which corporate governance
is going. The corporate governance literature is
sometimes an agent of change, more often it tries to
make sense of changes that are in process or that
have already occurred. This change, and less
frequently a deeper structural or systemic
transformation, is an inevitable product of the ways
in which company boards, executive managers,
corporate regulators, shareholders and other key
stakeholders have attempted to manage or mitigate
the environmental, political, and social challenges
and risks confronting the companies in which they
have a stake. Change can also occur as these actors
look to the future and seek ways of turning risks
and challenges into opportunities or, when this is
not possible, of nullifying them in some way. Often,
change comes about as a result of influential actors
trying to find ways of not allowing history to repeat
itself thereby avoiding another disaster like the
Global Financial Crisis. The Trump Presidency has
thrown up challenges and risks on each of these
levels and these have been registered in various
ways at home in the United States and abroad in the
countries it trades with (China is the obvious case in
point). In the midst of all this change and
transformation, corporate governance as a set of
principles, a field of practice and an academic
discipline has learned or been forced to evolve and
adapt. The literature review is chiefly concerned
with how this process of evolution and adaptation
has unfolded.
After reviewing the literature, the paper moves
on to provide a brief, introductory overview of the
existing system of corporate governance in
Australia. It then investigates and evaluates in
considerably more depth the new (4th) edition of the
Corporate
Governance
Principles
and
Recommendations
(hereafter
Principles
and
Recommendations or simply Principles). The
Corporate Governance Council of the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX) first released the new
edition in Draft form for stakeholder consultation
and set 27 July 2018 as the closing date for
submissions (the role of the Corporate Governance
Council is explained in the section of Australia’s
existing corporate governance system). The Council
then circulated a Consultation Paper in May 2018
and released the final version of the Principles in
February 2019. This is due to come into force for
financial years commencing on or after 1 January
2020. The paper’s examination of the Principles and
Recommendations (Draft and final versions) focuses
on those sections that can potentially make an
important contribution to current Australian and
global debates about the criteria by which company,
and board, performance should be measured. Of
particular interest is the inclusion in the Draft of the
new edition of the principles of the social licence to
operate, acting in a socially responsible manner, and
policies on whistleblowing and anti-corruption and
bribery. The absence in the final version of any

explicit reference to the social licence to operate will
receive particular attention.
Having reviewed the Consultation Draft and
final version of the new edition of Principles and
Recommendations, the chapter goes on to consider
some of the more interesting and provocative
responses to the governance implications of both
versions of the document. It considers, in particular,
the reaction to the two versions of the AICD,
Australia’s pre-eminent organisation representing
company directors, the views of ASIC1, Australia’s
chief corporate regulator (introduced in the
following section), and the evaluations of ACSI, a
large and influential organisation representing and
advocating for Australian institutional investors and
asset owners2. These several perspectives and
viewpoints together are helping to define the
contours of the ongoing Australian and global
debate about board governance and company
performance, what performance means and how it
should be measured, and about corporate
governance and its role and purpose more generally.

2. THE CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RECENT
LITERATURE
There can be little doubt that corporate governance,
both as a field of practice and an academic
discipline, is undergoing significant change. This
change is in response to a number of external
environmental, political and social challenges that
are forcing company boards and executive managers
to rethink corporate strategies, objectives, ways of
doing business and methods of engaging with the
shareholders and other stakeholders of the
companies they oversee. In short, and as this
literature review seeks to reveal and explain,
addressing these challenges is transforming the
meaning, purpose and conduct of corporate
governance. It is as well transforming the way in
which
board
performance
and
company
performance are evaluated. The corporation’s
purpose has in the process been going through a
process of dramatic review and redirection as well.
In the United States the Trump Presidency, in
particular Donald Trump himself, has compelled
boards to rethink their approach to climate change
and a range of significant social issues like same sex
marriage and LGBTIQ rights. At the same time, it has
forced boards, executive managers, investors and
shareholders as well as other stakeholders, to start
thinking about what the purpose of the corporation,
especially their own but more generally as well,
should be in this changing corporate governance
environment. This in turn is having significant
implications for companies’ corporate social
responsibility and risk management policies,
stakeholder engagement strategies, and for the
ethical business practices they adopt and how these
are enacted (for an interesting exploration of CSR as
a self-defence strategy against managerial discretion
costs, see Villarón-Peramato, Martínez-Ferrero,
1

It should be noted that ASIC made no formal or public response to the
release of the final version of the 4th edition even though it had commented
on the Draft.
2
In full, AICD is the Australian Institute of Company Directors and ACSI is
the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors.
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García-Sánchez, 2016). Marcia Weldon, for example,
argues that ‘boards of socially responsible
companies should not reverse course under the
Trump Administration’ but should instead ‘serve
stakeholder interests by staying the course even
when legislative changes related to the environment,
social issues, and corporate governance may allow
firms to relax standards or eliminate programs’
(Weldon, 2017; see also Bruner, 2018). This requires
‘at a minimum’ meaningful engagement with
shareholders including full disclosure to them of the
likely impacts of changes to environmental and
social policies. At a more fundamental level, boards
and senior managers have to ask themselves what
they are willing to accept or tolerate as they pursue
shareholder value, what they mean by shareholder
value, and the extent to which both of these align
with what shareholders actually want and expect
(Weldon, 2017). In a provocative piece about ‘letting
Trump be Trump’, Kelly Carter asks whether
shareholders prefer political connectedness or
corporate social responsibility and social justice. In
Carter’s view this is a very significant question
because the choice is a mutually-exclusive or binary
one (Carter, 2018). In other words, a company can in
response to ‘shocking’ presidential events (she uses
the example of Trump’s reactions to the 2017 white
supremacist rally in Charlottesville Virginia when
one counter-protester was run over and killed by a
neo-Nazi) either retain its existing political
connections or choose CSR and social justice and
sever these connections (Carter, 2018). Carter’s data
set comprises publicly-traded companies that left
Trump’s Manufacturing Jobs Initiative and Strategic
and Policy Forum following his remark that there
were ‘some very fine people on both sides’. For
Carter the ‘main finding’ of the study reported in her
paper is that shareholders prefer political
connectedness over CSR and the pursuit of social
justice.
Caroline Kaeb’s ‘essay’ ‘makes a first attempt to
lay out the main parameters of a normative
framework for corporate engagement with public
policy as part of a broader corporate responsibility
paradigm’ and seeks ‘to provide some guideposts for
companies to identify and engage on public policy
issues affecting their stakeholders and shaping their
business environment’ (Kaeb, 2018). Kaeb points out
that corporate leaders, and sometimes their
shareholders as well, are increasingly happy to be
seen as ‘agents of social change’ and ‘advocates on
human rights’ in the face of, for example, the ‘U.S.
President’s controversial immigration policies’. She
acknowledges that the motivations for taking on
these roles can be ‘complex’ ones ‘including strong
reputational considerations with very tangible
business implications’ (Kaeb, 2018; Nielson &
Thomsen, 2018 explore the role played by the
pursuit of legitimacy in firms’ selection of CSR
communication
strategies
and
practices).
It
nevertheless is the case that the way corporate
leadership engages with public policy has evolved
and adapted to the changing business and political
environment. These developments have ‘important
normative implications’ calling for ‘operational
guidance for companies’ on how best to put this
‘self-proclaimed
mandate’
into
practice.
Unfortunately, Kaeb is unable to offer such
operational guidance. However, she does suggest

that the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, giving effect to the Protect, Respect
and Remedy framework, might be a good starting
point. While the Guiding Principles do not set out
‘nuanced decision points for companies on how to
engage proactively with public policy in order to
advance societal values and human rights’ they do
establish ‘a normative framework on the corporate
responsibility to protect human rights’ and an
‘indispensable baseline’ for the human rights
responsibilities of business (Kaeb, 2018).
Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale
point out that due diligence is ‘at the heart’ of the
Guiding Principles. However, they argue that there
are two different concepts of ‘due diligence’ at work
in the Guiding Principles. They further claim that
this is not acknowledged in the Guiding Principles
nor therefore is there any attempt to ‘explain how
the two concepts relate to one another in the context
of business and human rights’ (Bonnitcha &
McCorquodale, 2017; see also Wettstein & Backer,
2015). While human rights lawyers, according to
Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, regard due diligence
‘as a standard of conduct required to discharge an
obligation’, business people typically understand
due diligence to be a process that is required to
manage business risks (Bonnitcha & McCorquodale,
2017). In their view, ‘a business enterprise’s
responsibility to respect human rights is best
understood as comprising two elements: its
responsibility for its own adverse human rights
impacts and its responsibility for the human rights
impacts of third parties with which it has business
relationships’ (Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, 2017).
They believe that this interpretation resolves the
fundamental confusion or inconsistency in the
Guiding Principles and also has practical relevance
in that it clarifies the standard of conduct that
businesses are expected to meet to avoid any
adverse human rights impacts. In her article on the
Guiding Principles and corporate moral agency,
Patricia Werhane considers the difficult question of
whether corporations should themselves be
regarded as having moral rights. Taking the view
that ‘human rights entail reciprocal responsibilities’
Werhane argues ‘if, as the Guiding Principles specify,
for-profit corporations have responsibilities to
protect human rights, then those whose rights are to
be protected by corporations have reciprocal
obligations to respect corporate rights’ (Werhane,
2015). She also argues that corporations are not
‘moral persons’ or ‘individual moral agents’.
However, because corporations are ‘collective
bodies’ that are owned, controlled and operated by
individual moral agents, it is possible to ‘ascribe to
corporations
secondary
moral
agency
as
organizations’ (Werhane, 2015). This means that
corporations and other organisations do have
limited rights but these do not exceed the rights of
individual persons and are restricted to economic
not political engagements and activities (to the
extent that these can be distinguished from each
other) (Werhane, 2015).
Brian
Cheffins
discusses
the
Trump
Administration’s
self-proclaimed
deregulatory
initiatives – in January 2017, for example, Trump
referred to the Dodd-Frank Act as a ‘disaster’ and
threatened to dismantle it – and wonders whether
‘government action’ as a constraint on company
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executives will recede, at least in the short to
medium term, should any of these initiatives ever
come to fruition (Cheffins, 2019). It appears that
Trump was quite serious when he complained about
Dodd-Frank because in May 2018 he signed into law
the Senate Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and
Consumer Protection Act. There is evidently some
debate about whether this new Act effectively
repealed and replaced Dodd-Frank that had become
law in July 2010 and was intended to restore
consumer confidence in the US financial industry
following the ‘recession’ brought on by the GFC.
Evidently, many Democrats and Republicans believe
that the new act ‘doesn’t weaken regulations for the
largest banks but do agree that it provides
‘regulatory relief to smaller banks and financial
institution (sic) throughout the United States’
(Dancer, 2019; see also Crabb, 2019). The repeal or
weakening of the Dodd-Frank Act has implications
well beyond the financial services industry and the
United States. For example, Nicola Dalla Via and
Paolo Perego investigate the Conflict Minerals
Disclosure (CMD) that is mandatory under Section
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Dalla Via & Perego,
2018). Conflict Minerals comprise coltan (tantalum is
extracted from this metallic ore), cassiterite (one of
the most important sources of tin), wolframite (the
main source of tungsten) and gold which requires no
further explanation. These are also known as the
T3G minerals. Dalla Via and Perego’s study makes a
contribution to the environmental, social and
governance (ESG) literature which deals with these
issues as being central to business strategy and
treats ESG reporting as one of the publicly-available
outcomes of managerial decision making. In other
words, ESG reporting is central to social or public
disclosure, stakeholder engagement, reputation
management, and the social licence to operate. The
Dodd-Frank Act’s CMD regime therefore played a
crucial, but not completely effective, role in
advancing these strategic purposes. As Dalla Via and
Perego point out, Trump’s proposed ‘radical
changes’ to the Dodd-Frank Act, including ‘relaxed’
enforcement of its CMD regime, ‘would conflict with
concurrent initiatives by the European Union, China,
Australia and Canada’ (Dalla Via & Perego, 2018).
They also note that conflict minerals are a ‘highly
controversial and sensitive topic’ that deserves
further study in the US and other jurisdictions. It is
not, of course, just conflict minerals that are
controversial and sensitive. Shane Gunster and
Robert Neubauer (2019), for example, investigate
‘extractivist development’ in Canada and a proposed
diluted bitumen pipeline. Gunster and Neubauer
look in particular at the way in which the concept of
social licence to operate has been converted in
Canada from a public relations term intended to
facilitate mining and extraction to a figure of speech
that can be used by opponents to constrain this sort
of development. Australia and other similar
countries have witnessed a similar conversion.
David Berger makes the fairly obvious point
that there is now ‘a growing recognition that the
model of stock(share)holder primacy is no longer
acceptable, and that corporations must focus on
broader purposes, beyond stockholder value’
(Berger, 2019). The renunciation or downgrading of
shareholder primacy as the corporation’s overriding
purpose means that it is now far less tenable for a

board to downsize its company’s workforce, reduce
the wages of its employees, minimise or evade taxes,
disregard workplace health and safety obligations,
or circumvent environmental regulations simply on
the pretext that these will increase the company’s
profits and share price. This all raises the significant
question of what the purpose of the corporation
should be if it is not the relentless pursuit of
shareholder value. While Berger doesn’t and
probably cannot provide a definitive answer to this
difficult question, he does remark that long overdue
is an expanded definition of corporate ownership ‘to
include stakeholders central to the evolving
understanding of corporate purpose’ (Berger, 2019;
see in this regard Berger’s account of public benefit
corporations and certified B Corps, both legal
entities that provide public benefits not simply
shareholder value). As Lynn Stout pointed out
several years ago, the view that the sole or at least
overriding purpose of the corporation is to
maximise shareholder (or, stockholder) value is not
fully supported by ‘law, history, logic, or the
available empirical data’ (Stout, 2013). Amongst
other things, the belief ‘in a single shareholder value’
is at odds with a number of realities. It does not fit
with the diversity and inconsistency of shareholder
interests. It also cannot account for the fact that the
interests of stakeholders such as employees,
suppliers
and
consumers
are
economically
important (and, often quite different from those of
shareholders) and therefore also worthy of
consideration. The belief overlooks as well that
maximising shareholder value doesn’t offer much
help with the problem of keeping control over
external costs or of ensuring that a company
behaves in a socially responsible manner (Stout,
2013; see also Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2018 who
empirically investigate the relationship between
corporate governance and
triple bottom line
sustainability performance through the lenses of
agency theory and stakeholder theory). For Thomas
Clarke, shareholder value is a ‘mythology’ and ‘one
of the most debilitating ideologies of modern times’.
Corporate managers are ‘incentivized and impelled’
to pursue shareholder value which is asserted by
agency theory to be the ‘ultimate corporate
objective’. According to Clarke, the relentless
pursuit of shareholder value has ‘damaged and
shrunk corporations, distracted and weakened
managers, diverted and undermined economies, and,
most paradoxically, neglected the long-term
interests of shareholders’ (Clarke, 20153).
The literature review has provided an
introduction to current debates in the corporate
governance literature about the meaning and
purpose of corporate governance including how
stakeholder interests can be served while
shareholder value is pursued in a single-minded
manner and, indeed, whether shareholder value
should any longer be regarded as an end in itself. It
has also considered changes in thinking about the
purpose of the corporation when shareholder value
is no longer taken to be its overriding purpose. The
3

Seen in these terms, the pursuit of shareholder value is closely related to
the pursuit of economic growth which also has serious environmental,
economic and social consequences. See , for example, Partington, 2019 who
points out that many economists argue ‘that GDP is incapable of connecting
the economy with social and environmental outcomes that determine our
wellbeing and the sustainability of the planet’.
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literature
review
also
provides
a
holistic
introduction to the investigation that follows of the
4th edition of the ASX Corporate Governance
Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and
Recommendations. The meaning and purpose of
corporate governance, the way in which stakeholder
interests should be served, and whether shareholder
value should be regarded as an end in itself are all
central issues in this investigation. The view adopted
here is that only once these important matters have
been settled can a meaningful debate begin about
board governance and company performance and
how governance and performance should be
assessed.

Chandrakumara, 2017; see also ASIC, 2014, ASIC,
2014a, ASIC, 2014b). Directors also have a duty to
disclose at a board meeting any conflicts of interests
or personal interests that could potentially impede
their ability to act in the best interests of their
company. A person who is an undischarged
bankrupt or who has a criminal conviction or been
convicted of a company law offence is not permitted
to be a company director.
The Corporate Governance Council of the ASX
represents prominent business, shareholder and
industry groups and plays an important role in
setting corporate governance standards for
companies listed on the ASX5. The main purpose of
the Council is ‘to develop and issue principle-based
recommendations on the corporate governance
practices to be adopted by ASX listed entities’ with a
view to enhancing investor confidence and assisting
listed entities ‘to meet stakeholder expectations in
relation to their governance’ (ASX, n.d.). The
Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and
Recommendations sets out an authoritative list of
‘recommended corporate governance practices for
entities listed on the ASX that, in the Council’s view,
are likely to achieve good governance outcomes and
meet the reasonable expectations of most investors
in most situations’ (ASX, 2014). The Principles and
Recommendations are not surprisingly based on and
reflect the ASX Listing Rules but most specifically
Rule 4.10.3 which requires a listed entity to include
either in its annual report or on its website a
‘governance statement’ disclosing ‘the extent to
which the entity has followed the recommendations
set by the Council during the reporting period’ (ASX,
2018). In other words, Rule 4.10.3 obliges listed
entities ‘to benchmark their corporate governance
practices against the Council’s recommendations
and, where they do not conform, to disclose that fact
and the reasons why’ (ASX, n.d.). Should an entity
not have followed any of the recommendations it
must in its governance statement identify which
recommendation or recommendations haven’t been
followed, provide reasons justifying why it hasn’t
followed the recommendation/s, and explain
whether any alternative governance arrangements
have been adopted. This is known as the ‘if not, why
not’ approach, framework or requirement (ASX 2014;
ASX, 2018a).

3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA:
BOARD
GOVERNANCE
AND
COMPANY
PERFORMANCE
3.1. A brief overview of Australia’s existing system
of corporate governance: Legal and regulatory
dimensions
The
Australian
Securities
and
Investments
Commission (ASIC) is the Australian corporate,
markets and financial services regulator. More
prosaically, ASIC is Australia’s chief corporate
regulator. It is an ‘independent Commonwealth
Australian Government body’ established by the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Act 2001 that defines its powers and which ASIC
itself administers. However, most of ASIC’s
regulatory activities are carried out under the
Corporations Act 2001. ASIC has three strategic
priorities: ‘Promoting investor and financial
consumer trust and confidence’; ‘Ensuring fair,
orderly and transparent markets’; ‘Providing
efficient and accessible registration’ (ASIC, 2018a).
Whether or not ASIC as corporate regulator lives up
to these priorities and high ideals has been and
remains a matter of considerable contention4.
Corporations in Australia, and their boards and
directors, are required to comply with some pretty
light and basic rules and regulations with
compliance being overseen by ASIC. For example, an
Australian publicly-listed company must have a
company secretary and at least three directors.
Having fewer than three directors is a breach of the
Corporations Act for which a non-compliant
company can be fined or prosecuted. Directors and
company secretaries must also ensure that the
company keeps up-to-date and accurate financial
and other records and to ensure that the company is
solvent (by passing a resolution to this effect at a
meeting of the board of directors). Company
directors and company secretaries have as well
several personal responsibilities imposed by the
Corporations Act including ‘to be ‘honest and
careful’, to know what the company is doing, to
ensure that the company pays its debts in a timely
fashion and keeps up-to-date and accurate financial
records, to act in the best interests of the company
rather than their own, and to use any information
obtained as a result of being a director of the
company in the company’s best interests’ (Rix and

3.2. The changing Australian corporate governance
system: A brief introduction and overview
As seen above, in issuing a Consultation Draft of the
new edition of the Principles and Recommendations
the ASX Corporate Governance Council began a
process of public consultation with the business,
shareholder and industry groups that comprise the
Council’s membership. The purpose of the
Consultation Draft (and, the Consultation Paper) was
to seek the views on the proposed changes to the
Principles and Recommendations of the broad range
of stakeholders represented by these groups. The
new edition is the fourth and revises and updates
the 3rd edition which was published in 2014 (for
brief discussion of the 3rd edition, see Rix and
Chandrakumara, 2017). The final version of the 4th
edition was released in February 2019. The Council

4

See, for example, Verrender, 2018, Mottram, Clarke, and Attard, 2018,
David, 2018, Danckert, 2018.
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noted in its May 2018 Consultation Paper as it did in
the Draft and the final version that the Principles
and Recommendations apply to all listed entities
irrespective of their legal form, and whether or not
they are established in Australia or in another
jurisdiction and are internally or externally managed
(ASX, 2018a; ASX, 2019).
As the Consultation Paper put it, the then
proposed new, 2019 edition of the Principles and
Recommendations sought to address ‘emerging and
global issues’ having an impact on corporate
governance and how it is or should be practised. The
Corporate Governance Council clearly believed that
these issues either were not adequately addressed in
the 2014 edition or not considered in it at all. In any
event, among the emerging and global governance
issues that would be addressed in the 2019 version
were the social licence to operate, corporate culture
and values, whistleblowing and whistleblower
protection policies, policies targeting corruption and
bribery6, board-level gender diversity, and policies
addressing cyber risks and risks arising from
climate change (ASX, 2018a). The Council also made
clear in the Consultation Paper its strong belief that
the changes and revisions it was considering for
inclusion could be accommodated within the
existing ‘if not, why not’ framework.
It should also be noted here that the changes to
the Principles and Recommendations the Corporate
Governance Council proposed in the Consultation
Paper both anticipated and responded to the
findings of recent public enquires but, in particular,
the
significant
corporate
governance
(and,
regulatory) failings that were disclosed and exposed
in the Hayne Royal Commission. This Commission,
formally the Royal Commission into Misconduct in
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services
Industry presided over by Commissioner the
Honourable Kenneth Madison Hayne (formerly a
Justice of the High Court of Australia), was belatedly
and very reluctantly established by the Australian
Government
in
mid-December
2017.
The
Commission issued an interim report (in three
volumes and with a separate Executive Summary) at
the end of September 2018 and released a final
report at the beginning of February 20197. In
establishing the Royal Commission, the Australian
Government handed the Commission a remit to
‘consider the conduct of banks, insurers, financial
services providers and superannuation funds (not
including self-managed superannuation funds)’ and
investigate ‘how well equipped regulators in
particular, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA) are to identify and
address misconduct’ (Morrison and Turnbull, 2018).
The Royal Commission’s remit, or Terms of
Reference, did not extend to a consideration of
macro-financial stability or the resilience of

Australia’s banks, clearly one of its shortcomings
and a significant one at that.
It is not an overstatement to say that the
revelations in the Royal Commission of breathtaking
misconduct, illegal and unethical behaviour
including utter contempt for, and cheating or
deception of, customers have led to a crisis of public
confidence in Australian banks, in particular, the
‘Big Four’ (Commonwealth Bank of Australia,
National Australia Bank, Westpac, and ANZ) and in
other major players in the country’s superannuation
and insurance industries. Whether or not this crisis
of confidence extends to investors and shareholders
is perhaps a question that can only answered over
the longer term and allowing for the usual and
expected fluctuations in banks’ and financial
institutions’ share prices. In any event, the conduct
and behaviour exposed by the Royal Commission
have also made a mockery of banks’ and financial
institutions’ codes of conduct and associated ethics
and corporate social responsibility ‘commitments’.
The disclosures in the Royal Commission have as
well revealed that Australia’s banks have adopted at
best a cavalier, tick-a-box approach to corporate
governance and the well-established, core principles
underpinning it, pre-eminently, transparency and
disclosure, responsibility and accountability, and
integrity and honesty8.

4. THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS: BOARD
GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE IN A
CHANGING DISPENSATION
4.1. Corporate culture
The principal proposed revisions to the Principles
and
Recommendations,
contained
in
the
Consultation Draft, amounted essentially to a
significant redrafting of Principle 3 that had in
earlier versions simply enunciated a basic
expectation that boards and management of listed
entities should behave ethically and responsibly. The
revision of the text of this Principle in the Draft
included a major rewording and extension so that it
became ‘Instil the desired culture: A listed entity
should instil and continually reinforce a culture
across the organisation of acting lawfully, ethically
and in a socially responsible manner (ASX, 2018b).’
As seen above, the Consultation Paper made clear
the Corporate Governance Council’s belief that by
acting in a lawful, ethical and responsible manner a
company’s
board
and
management
can
unambiguously demonstrate their understanding of
the ‘fundamental importance’ of the company’s
social licence to operate and commitment to
sustaining this over the longer term (ASX, 2018a).
Taking this a large step further, the Consultation
Draft referred to a social licence to operate as one of
a listed entity’s ‘most valuable assets’ (ASX, 2018b).
As has already been noted above, the final
version of the 4th edition makes no explicit reference
to the social licence to operate and with its removal

6

For some idea of the extent of the problem of bribery and corruption
around the world, also demonstrating that it is a very significant corporate
governance issue, see Dell and McDevitt, 2018.
7
The three volumes of the Interim Report and the Executive Summary can
be found at https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/reports.
aspx. The Final Report, released on 1 February 2019 and tabled in
Parliament on 4 February and also in three volumes, can also be found at
this link. Chapter 6 of the Final Report deals with questions and makes
recommendations relating to Culture, governance and remuneration in
entities across the Australian financial services industry.

8

For some of the media, academic and other coverage of the Banking Royal
Commission’s hearings and disclosures see, for example, Linden and Staples,
2018a, Linden and Staples, 2018b, Braddon and Hooper, 2018, Gergis,
2018, Petschler, 2018, Knight, 2018, Beck and Paton, 2018.
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seemingly abandons one of the consultation Draft’s
principal and most valuable assets9. In spite of
jettisoning the social licence, however, the final
version does slightly expand on the text of
Principle 3. This now reads ‘Instil a culture of acting
lawfully, ethically and responsibly: a listed entity
should instil and continually reinforce a culture
across the organisation of acting lawfully, ethically
and responsibly’ (ASX, 2019). The Draft’s
Commentary on Principle 3 contained a quite
lengthy explanation about why the social licence
deserves to be regarded as one of a listed entity’s
most valuable assets. This Commentary provided as
well an account of how an entity can go about
building and sustaining its social licence by earning
and maintaining the trust of a broader range of
stakeholders than just its shareholders. The Draft’s
Commentary also made the point that an entity’s
ability to support and generate ‘long term and
sustainable value creation’ is based on the trust
earned from the different stakeholders (ASX, 2018b;
the full Commentary to draft Principle 3 can also be
found here).
Recommendation 3.1 in the Draft version reads
‘A listed entity should articulate and disclose its
core
values’
(the
final
version
of
this
Recommendation refers only to ‘values’). The
Commentary to this Recommendation in the Draft
emphasises that because of the importance of an
entity’s social licence to operate, ‘it the statement of
core values will usually contain a commitment by the
entity to complying fully with its legal obligations
and to acting ethically and in a socially responsible
manner’ ASX, 2018b; emphasis added). Not only can
a statement of core values ‘properly implemented’
be the basis on which an entity builds its corporate
culture but also encourage ‘good decision making’
and function as a useful recruitment and retention
tool. To serve these purposes, however, an entity’s
statement of its core values has to be a good deal
more than ‘a poster on a wall’. On the contrary, the
core values must be lived and breathed by the entity,
and its board, senior management and employees.
This highlights the need for ethical leadership from
board and senior management who should lead by
example firmly to ‘set the tone at the top’. As the
Consultation Draft states, ‘this includes ensuring
that their own actions and decisions are consistent
with the entity’s stated values and that any conduct
by others within the organisation that is inconsistent
with those values is dealt with appropriately and
proportionately’ (ASX, 2018b).
The Commentary to Recommendation 3 in the
final version as already noted contains no mention
of the social licence and is therefore a good deal
briefer than the draft version. However, the final
version suggests that in ‘formulating its values’ a
listed entity should ‘consider what behaviours are
needed from its officers and employees to build long
term sustainable value for its security holders
including the need for the entity to preserve and
protect its reputation and standing in the
community and with key stakeholders, such as
customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, law
makers and regulators’ (ASX, 2019; these key
stakeholders are the same as those included in the

Draft’s commentary on the social licence). While it is
ultimately the board that has responsibility for
formulating and approving an entity’s statement of
values, the final version puts more onus than the
Draft did on the entity’s ‘executive team’ to
‘inculcate’ the company’s stated values throughout
the entire organisation. Inculcating these values
across the organisation requires the executive team
to ensure that all of the entity’s employees acquire
‘appropriate training’ on its values. In interacting
with staff, senior executive should as well
continually reference and reinforce the values in this
way setting the ‘tone at the top’ (ASX, 2019).
Consistent with the desire to win the genuine
and lasting trust of key stakeholders, and of the
public more generally, Principle 3 in both the Draft
and the final version also includes new
Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 dealing respectively
with the need for a listed entity to have and disclose
a whistleblowing policy and an anti-bribery and
corruption
policy.
In
both
versions,
Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 are divided into parts
a) and b). The Commentary in the final version on
these two Recommendations is considerably briefer
and less detailed than that in the Draft. In the
following, the two Recommendations will be
considered in turn with the focus being on part a) of
each.
Before doing so, however, it needs to be
pointed out that in the Draft, Recommendation 3.3b
stated that an entity should ‘ensure that the board is
informed of any material concerns raised under that
policy that call into question the culture of the
organisation’ (ASX, 2018b; emphasis added). In the
final version, part b) simply states that the entity
should ‘ensure that the board or a committee of the
board is informed of any material incidents reported
under the policy’ (ASX, 2019) thus converting mere
‘concerns’ into the harder ‘incidents’, jettisoning any
mention of culture as well as adding reference to ‘a
committee of the board’. In both versions,
Recommendation 3.4a calls for an entity to have and
disclose an anti-bribery and corruption policy with
the final version stating in 3.4b as it did in 3.3b that
the board or a committee of the board should be
informed of any material breaches of this policy
(there was no reference in Draft 3.4b to a board
committee).

4.2. Whistleblowing policy
Recommendation 3.3 states (in both versions) that
the purpose of a whistleblower policy is to
encourage employees, who in the words of the Draft
are ‘the best source of information about whether a
listed entity is living up to it values’, to report
suspected
unethical,
unlawful
or
socially
irresponsible conduct (‘socially’ is not in the final
version). The Draft also calls for listed entities to
‘instil and continually reinforce a culture of
‘speaking up’. Employees should in addition have
confidence that there are ‘suitable protections’ of
their identity and confidentiality to safeguard them
from ‘retaliation or victimisation’ when they 'speak
up’ (ASX, 2018b). Much of the remainder of the
Commentary in the Draft on Recommendation 3.3
deals with the sorts of suspicious behaviour or
observed incidents that employees should report
under the whistleblowing policy and how these

9

For some of the corporate governance and other issues raised by the social
licence to operate see, for example, Cullen-Knox et al, 2017, Wright and
Bice, 2017, Black, 2018.
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should be reported and to whom. It therefore
amongst other things also calls for adequate training
both for employees about the policy including their
rights and obligations under the policy and for
managers
who
are
authorised
to
receive
‘whistleblowing reports’ about the appropriate way
of dealing with any disclosures they receive.
As noted above, the Commentary on this
Recommendation in the final version is much briefer
than that in the Draft. As in the Draft, the final
version acknowledges that employees are usually the
best source of information on whether or not an
entity is living up to its values and that its
whistleblower policy should therefore encourage
them ‘to speak up about any unlawful, unethical or
irresponsible behaviour within the organisation’
(ASX, 2019). Beyond this, the Commentary in the
final version simply reiterates the Recommendation
in slightly longer form and makes no mention of
encouraging a culture of speaking up, of the need
for adequate whistleblower protections, or of the
requirement for appropriate training.

not-for-profit sectors’ (AICD, 2018a). As its
Constitution points out, the Institute is a public
company limited by guarantee having as its key
objectives
‘through
education,
to
promote
excellence, enterprise and integrity in the directors
of all corporations, to improve their knowledge and
skill with respect to their rights, duties and
responsibilities and to inculcate the highest
standards of ethics among directors’ (AICD, 2016).
With such mission, membership and objectives
as these it could too easily be assumed that AICD
would simply fall in to line with the draft 4th edition
of the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council
Principles and Recommendations and welcome the
Consultation Draft with open arms an endorsement
which would likely have seen it become the final
version with little or no further revision. AICD did
seem broadly to welcome the Draft, or at least the
opportunity to respond to it in detail, agreeing with
the Corporate Governance Council that ‘now is an
opportune time to review the Principles and
consider whether they remain fit-for-purpose in the
context of emerging domestic and global issues in
corporate governance’ (AICD, 2018b: 1). AICD also
acknowledged in its submission that the proposed
amendments contained in the Draft ‘cover many
topical and important issues’. It supported as well
the ‘focus on long-term value creation’ and the
Draft’s recognition of the importance of ‘active
consideration and engagement by listed entities with
stakeholders and community expectations’ (AICD,
2018b: 2). However, in its response AICD did as well
express a number of what can only regarded as
serious concerns and misgivings that it had about
the direction the Principles and Recommendations
appeared to be taking.
Seeming to ignore the Corporate Governance
Council’s assurances to the contrary, AICD was
principally concerned with the apparent move in the
Draft from a ‘principles-based approach’ to one that
it regarded was ‘becoming too granular or
prescriptive’ (AICD, 2018b). In spite of the retention
in the Draft of the ‘if not, why not’ approach, AICD
thought the adoption of what it regarded as a more
prescriptive approach carried with it a considerable
risk of listed entities adhering to the Principles ‘as a
‘check box’ compliance matter rather than as a
starting-point for a consideration of their own
corporate governance needs’ (AICD, 2018b). In
addition, in AICD’s view more prescriptive and
accordingly more demanding expectations like the
ones the Council was recommending could deter
‘smaller, resource-constrained’ companies (which
make up the majority of ASX-listed entities) from
fully embracing and supporting the spirit and the
letter of the redrafted Principles. It took particular
exception to ‘the increased level of commentary and
prescription (from a 38 page third edition to a
proposed 55 page fourth edition) which risks
detracting focus from the most material issues’ as
well as ‘deviating from established legal frameworks’
(AICD, 2018b; the final version is 36 pages in
length)10.
AICD was especially agitated by the inclusion in
the Draft of the ‘concepts’ of ‘social licence to
operate’ and ‘acting in a socially responsible
manner’. In its view these concepts are ‘subjective’

4.3. Anti-bribery and corruption policy
As already seen, in both versions Recommendation
3.4 calls on listed entities to have an anti-bribery
and corruption policy and to ensure that their board
(committee of the board is added in the final
version) is advised of any ‘material breaches’ of the
policy. As both the Draft and final version point out,
it is a serious criminal offence to give bribes or other
‘improper payments’ to public officials because
doing so ‘can do major damage to a listed entity’s
social licence to operate’ (ASX, 2018b) or ‘damage a
listed entity’s reputation and standing in the
community’ (ASX, 2019). Amongst other things, and
just as was the case with Recommendation 3.3, the
Draft’s Commentary on this recommendation
includes a call for adequate training of managers
and employees who could be exposed to bribery or
corruption on how these can be detected and
appropriate ways of dealing with occurrences of
them (ASX, 2018b). There is no mention of the need
for training in the final version.

5.
THE
NEW
PRINCIPLES
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: SOME MAJOR RESPONSES
AND REACTIONS
5.1. Australian Institute of Company Directors
(AICD)
Before considering AICD’s response to the
Consultation Draft, a brief introduction to its role
and mission will be in order. The Mission of the
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) is,
according to its website, ‘to provide leadership on
director issues and promote excellence in
governance to achieve a positive impact for the
economy and society’ by undertaking ‘governance
education, director development and advocacy’
(AICD, 2018a). The Institute is a national
organisation comprising seven state and territory
divisions and with a national Board (its ‘governing
body’) consisting of 12 directors; it has a
membership of 40,000 including directors and other
‘senior leaders from business, government and the
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(the former, even ‘highly subjective’) and ‘fluid’ ones.
And, for AICD, the concepts not only amount to an
addition of unneeded ‘complexity and uncertainty’
to the already-complex and demanding governance
mix but also do not properly reflect the existing
‘legal and fiduciary duties of directors’, in particular,
the statutory duties of directors as laid down in the
Corporations Act 2001 (AICD, 2018b). Not only did
AICD regard the two concepts as being subjective
but, specifically with respect to social licence
thought that it carried as well a risk of being
‘interpreted differently by different stakeholders’
whose interests in any case are ‘often complex and
competing’ (AICD, 2018b).
As for Recommendations 3.3 and 3.4 for
entities to have respectively a whistleblowing policy
and an anti-corruption and bribery policy, AICD’s
response was what only can be described as
somewhat dismissive if not downright pejorative. In
AICD’s view, the recommendation to have a
whistleblowing policy was essentially redundant (not
its term) because the Australian Government was
considering the introduction of legislation that will
likely impose ‘different obligations upon companies’
from those being proposed by ASX11. And, AICD
thought that the anti-corruption and bribery policy
Recommendation ran the risk ‘that by focusing on
anti-bribery and corruption policies, other equally
important issues could be seen as requiring less
focus’ (AICD, 2018b). AICD provided examples of
neither the different obligations nor the other
equally important issues to which it was referring.
AICD announced and commented on the
release of the final version of 4th edition of the
Principles and Recommendations in two publications
in its on-line journals Membership Update and
Company Director. In the first of these, Sally
Linwood (Senior Policy Adviser) and Christian Gergis
(Head of Policy) highlighted amongst other things
the inclusion in the final version of the requirements
for listed entities: to articulate and disclose their
values; to have a ‘robust’ whistleblowing policy (as it
noted, this is now particularly important in light of
the passing by the Australian Parliament of the
enhancing whistleblower protections Act); and, to
disclose to the board or a board committee material
incidents reported under the whistleblowing policy
or material breaches of the anti-bribery and
corruption policy (Linwood & Gergis, 2019a).
Linwood and Gergis coyly pointed out that the social
licence to operate ‘did not find its way’ into the final
version. They also remarked that the social licence
‘had been the subject of heated debate’ during the
consultation process revealing ‘a wide gulf of
opinion between those who saw the concept as
pivotal to business operating in a broader societal
context, and others, like the AICD, who believed that
such a subjective term had no place in a quasiregulatory document’ (Linwood & Gergis, 2019a).
The second AICD publication on the final version,
also authored by Linwood and Gergis, essentially
provides a re-run of the first publication (Linwood &
Gergis, 2019b).

5.2. Australian Securities
Commission (ASIC)

and

Investments

In ASIC’s submission to the Corporate Governance
Council providing its commentary on and
recommended amendments to the Consultation
Draft, it expressed the view that the primary
purpose of corporate governance principles and
standards should be to provide investors with ‘clear
disclosure’ of a listed entity’s ‘actual corporate
governance practices’ and, where necessary, bring
about enhancements of these practices (ASIC,
2018b). One of its chief concerns was accordingly
that corporate governance statements in Australia,
like those required under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3
(which, as explained above, outlines the ‘if not, why
not’ approach or framework), ‘sometimes lack
transparency’ because they don’t always provide an
accurate picture of the corporate practices actually
followed by an entity. This can mean that entities
are required simply ‘to disclose the existence of a
governance policy or framework rather than how’
the policy or framework is implemented leading to
‘inadequate and largely meaningless disclosure’ of a
‘boilerplate’ sort which is merely rolled over without
change or revision from one year to the next (ASIC,
2018b). In sum, boilerplate and ‘tick the box’
disclosure requirements like these ‘detract from the
objectives of driving improvements in practices or
even of setting an effective baseline standard of
governance for larger listed entities’ (ASIC, 2018b).
ASIC
therefore
recommended
that
the
Corporate
Governance
Council
consider
an
alternative model of disclosing against the Principles
and Recommendations which it believed should
ideally provide a ‘best practice’ model of corporate
governance for listed entities. This would require a
listed entity to produce:
 ‘a standalone document describing its
corporate governance framework’ that would be
made available to investors on the entity’s website
with a link to this document provided in the entity’s
Corporate Governance statement;
 ‘an annual statement describing the entity’s
implementation of the corporate governance
framework’ (ASIC, 2018b).
In addition, ASIC recommended that the ASX
actively monitor and assess the disclosures made by
entities under the Principles and Recommendations.
It
also
thought
that
the
Principles
and
Recommendations should have the function of
setting ‘a minimum level of governance practices’ for
larger listed entities which is an expectation
‘consistent with the degree of attention given to
recent governance failures by these entities
highlighted by the Banking Royal Commission and
APRA’s inquiry into CBA and the need for larger
listed entities to be held to a higher standard of
conduct (ASIC, 2018b)12. In view of these
considerations, ASIC suggested that the ASX could
even consider making all or some of its Listing Rules
mandatory for the larger entities on its official list
or promoting some recommendations to the status
of Listing Rules. As observed above (n. 1), ASIC
offered no formal or public response to the release
of the final version of the 4th edition.

11

In the period between the appearance of the Draft and the release of the
final version of the 4th edition of the Principles and Recommendations, the
Australian Parliament passed the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing
Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 receiving Royal Ascent on 12 March
2019.
The
Act
can
be
found
at
the
following
link:
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019A00010.
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For the background to and outcomes of APRA’s CBA inquiry, see Ryan,
2018 and APRA, 2018.

37

Corporate Law & Governance Review/ Volume 1, Issue 2, 2019

group of stakeholders’ and therefore also of
assuring that shareholder value can continue to be
increased on a sustainable basis.
In a Media Release on 27 February 2019 and in
keeping with its counterparts, ACSI welcomed the
release of the final version of the 4th edition. It noted
that a catalyst for the review of the Principles ‘was
the desire to address emerging concerns around
corporate culture and trust’ and also observed that
‘the importance of corporate culture, trust and the
link to a company’s reputation and standing in the
community has again been highlighted by the Royal
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking,
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry’
(ACSI, 2019). While the Media Release made no
mention of the omission of the social licence to
operate in the final version – the presence of which
in the Draft ACSI had so fulsomely praised – it
nevertheless strongly supported ‘the new provisions
introduced on corporate values and appropriate
treatment of stakeholders, corporate culture,
diversity, remuneration and risk’ (ACSI, 2019). The
media release highlighted amongst other things the
Recommendations requiring listed entities to
articulate and disclose their values and support a
healthy culture through having and disclosing a
whistle-blower policy and an anti-bribery and
corruption policy.

5.3. Australian Council of Superannuation Investors
(ACSI)
ACSI has a membership of 39 Australian and
international institutional investors and asset
owners which in aggregate ‘manage over $2.2 trillion
in assets and own on average 10% of every ASX200
company’ (ACSI, 2016). ACSI was established in 2001
to serve as a ‘strong and collective’ voice for its
members ‘on environmental, social and governance
(ESG) issues’ based on their shared belief ‘that ESG
risks and opportunities have a material impact on
investment outcomes.’ ACSI’s members also believe
that as fiduciary investors ‘they have a responsibility
to act to enhance the long-term value of the savings
entrusted to them’ and therefore ‘collaborate
through ACSI to achieve genuine, measurable and
permanent improvements in the ESG practices and
performance of the companies they invest in’ (ACSI,
2016).
In its submission to the Corporate Governance
Council’s stakeholder consultation on the draft 4th
edition of the Principles and Recommendations, ACSI
welcomed the new edition because it ‘reflects
evolving perspectives in best practice corporate
governance and include a greater emphasis on
values,
ethics
and
broader
stakeholder
accountability’. It accordingly gave strong support to
the amendments and additions proposed by the
Council that will ‘strengthen the Principles and
Recommendations and successfully address a range
of contemporary governance concerns’ and ‘provide
investors and other stakeholders with improved
insight into the robustness and effectiveness of the
entities that they invest in’ (ACSI, 2018). The
contemporary governance concerns that ACSI was
glad to see addressed in the new edition include the
social licence to operate, corporate values and
culture, ‘whistleblower rules’, anti-bribery and
corruption policies, improving diversity, corporate
reporting, and climate-related disclosures13.
ACSI strongly supported ‘the expansion of
Principle 3 to include instilling and continually
reinforcing a culture across the organisation of
acting lawfully, ethically and in a socially
responsible manner’ because ‘a listed entity’s social
licence to operate is one of its most valuable assets’
which can be ‘lost or seriously damaged’ when the
entity, its directors or employees ‘are perceived to
have acted unlawfully, unethically or in a socially
irresponsible manner (ACSI, 2018). Without referring
to any cases in particular, ACSI pointed out that
‘recent examples demonstrate that corporate
misconduct can have dire consequences for
shareholder value’. On the other hand, ‘a strong
corporate culture can contribute to the attraction
and retention of talent, the development and
maintenance of reputation and trust and support
the effectiveness and efficiency of operational
management’ as well as contributing to ‘financial
strength and resilience’ (ACSI, 2018). In ACSI’s view,
‘improved transparency’ is another important way of
rebuilding the trust of investors and ‘a broader

6. CONCLUSIONS: BOARD GOVERNANCE AND
COMPANY PERFORMANCE IN THE NEW SYSTEM
The Draft of the 4th edition of the ASX Corporate
Governance
Council’s
Principles
and
Recommendations made a valuable (and, frankly
quite daring) but sadly short-lived contribution to
the hotly debated question, within Australia and
globally, about the criteria by which board and
company performance should be measured. This is a
question that goes to nothing less than the very
point or purpose of corporate governance. In the
end, then, it is a question about exactly what
corporate governance is and why it matters, more
correctly, whether it does matter at all.
The Draft made fairly clear the Corporate
Governance
Council’s
belief
that
corporate
governance does matter but really only when the
interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders
and investors, are genuinely taken in to account in
the decision making of company boards and
directors and resulting actions of executive
managers and other employees. These actions and
decisions after all are the basis of stakeholders’
trust and determine whether a company earns a
social licence to operate from them. However, it left
largely unaddressed the issue of how company
directors, and by extension senior managers as well,
should be remunerated because profit, share price
and dividend can no longer be taken as the sole or
even most important measures of a company’s
performance at least in the short term. More
challengingly in governance terms, it promoted nonshareholder stakeholders to an almost equal footing
with their shareholder counterparts and inversely
relegated shareholders to mere stakeholders. It
therefore remained to be seen whether the
Consultation Draft survived in its published form
and if it did whether the Principles and
Recommendations continued to have the authority

13

See also ACSI, 2017, ACSI Governance Guidelines: A guide to investor
expectations of Australian listed companies. The core principles
underpinning ACSI’s Governance Guidelines are: Board oversight of all
material risks; Sustainable, long-term value creation; Active ownership;
Transparency; Licence to operate. A brief explanation of each principle is
provided at page 5 of the Guidelines.
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that it once had and remained the benchmark it was
always intended to be. Promisingly, the fulsome
welcome with which ACSI had greeted the new
edition suggested that it just might. If so, it would
have helped to set the future course for corporate
governance as a set of principles, a field of practice
and as an academic discipline.
It
appears
that
the
Principles
and
Recommendations in its 4th edition does retain the
authority it has long held and remains the
benchmark governance document for corporate
(and, non-corporate) Australia. However, the
omission from the final version of the social licence
to operate and of the related commentary which
highlighted the importance of core values and
behaving ethically and in a socially responsible
manner suggests that corporate Australia still has a
long way to go before long-term and sustainable
value creation displaces a self-defeating focus on
short-termism. Clearly, organisations like the AICD
exerted considerable pressure on the Corporate
Governance Council to remove or lessen the strong
emphasis on these principles and issues that was
one of the Draft’s most valuable assets. ACSI
obviously had far less influence. It seems then that
corporate Australia has yet to fully acknowledge the
risk that climate change presents to value creation
even in the short term and therefore of the need to
change governance principles, structures and

practices to meet this challenge before it is too late.
The Corporate Governance Council had valiantly
attempted to set corporate Australia on a course of
long-term
sustainability
and
resilience
but
unfortunately it fell at the final hurdle.

7. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The article has several limitations. It has provided an
in-depth analysis of important sections of the
Principles and Recommendations in its Draft and
final versions and some commentary on the
responses to both versions of several of the
Corporate
Governance
Council’s
principal
stakeholders.
There
are
clearly
abundant
opportunities for researchers in the future to look at
the
Principles
and
Recommendations
more
holistically and to monitor how much impact over
the coming 5 to 10 years or so the document has on
the conduct in Australia of corporate governance, on
company behaviour more generally, and on the
reactions of retail and institutional shareholders.
There will also be many opportunities for research
comparing
contemporary
developments
in
Australian corporate governance with developments
elsewhere around the world.
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